Two years into President Petro's administration and one year after the drug policy was published, governmental entities have taken actions and initiatives to advance its objectives. However, there is no clear strategy to achieve these goals across its components, nor an organized planning and implementation process.
One of the main risks of President Petro's drug policy is that it could remain merely a set of intentions, as has happened with previous governments whose messages and announcements failed to materialize. If this occurs, an opportunity to consolidate progress towards changing the drug policy, as promised by President Petro, will be lost.
Some factors that explain the obstacles to concrete progress in implementation include:
Numerous announcements that place the policy on the public agenda, but lack planning and an organized implementation.
An ambitious and well-structured policy without clear goals for this administration and each of the governmental entities.
Agencies without clear leadership, which limit inter-agency coordination and produce scatter actions.
Limited government capabilities that have neither been analyzed nor strengthened to respond to the policy commitments and the government goals.
Lack of clarity about the availability of fixed budgetary resources year after year.
A slow learning curve for officials, most of whom are new and have formed teams with inexperienced personnel.
Frequent changes in leadership positions responsible for key government agencies responsible for implementation of the drug policy.
Deteriorating security situation due to increased territorial influence of armed groups and the consolidation of their territorial and social control.
Absence of rigorous planning processes and available funding for key policy interventions.
The FIP identified drug policy changes or progress in five areas of the 2023–2033 National Drug Policy:
Cocaine Seizures
The government's continuous messages and announcements on its achievements on cocaine seizures suggest that this is one of the drug policy priorities of the “Affecting strategic and high-value actors in the drug trafficking system” policy´s component, even though there is no evidence of the impact of seizures on the supply of cocaine at the national or international level.
Considering that coca and cocaine paste prices in Colombia's territories have been at their lowest levels during this administration, it does not appear that seizures are putting any pressure on the illegal cocaine market.
Although the number of cocaine seizures, the destruction of production laboratories, and the confiscation of coca by-products and chemical inputs have increased, the proportion of seized cocaine relative to its potential production has actually decreased. In 2023, 2,664 mt of cocaine were produced and 746 mt were seized; that is, 28% of the cocaine produced was seized. A reduction of almost ten percentage points compared to the proportion in 2022.
The fight against the upper structures in the drug trafficking chain has turned out to be the implementation of traditional activities, with different emphases in each government, and without evidence of their impact. It is inconsistent with the vision of the new drug policy, as well as with the intention to differentiate itself from that of other governments, that the public agenda on drugs is being monopolized by the seizures of cocaine.
A strategy is required that, in coordination with the security policy, seeks to:
Meet strategic - not only management - objectives for seizures and other interdiction efforts, and in relation to prosecution and conviction for trafficking and money laundering.
Adapt to changes in the cocaine market and in the evolution of the actors that control it, which the significant reduction of coca by-products at the local level in Colombia –so-called “coca crisis”- could be indicating.
Coordinate its strategic objectives to help reduce the territorial control of armed groups.
Substitution and plans for transition to legal economies
The latest official coca cultivation monitoring report indicated that 253,000 hectares were cultivated in 2023 in Colombia, a 10% increase compared to 2022. It also highlighted a 53% increase in potential cocaine production, driven by the gradual shift over recent years from small-scale family farming to an agro-industrial model, significantly boosting productivity.
The slight increase in coca cultivation could give the government some breathing room, as it might be seen as a relatively minor rise compared to previous years. However, it is a sign of the significant opportunity presented by the "coca crisis," which has discouraged further expansion of coca plantation in the country since 2022.
The 2023–2024 National Drug Policy includes a component on “Transitioning to Legal Economies in Rural and Special Management Areas” through an Integrated Model for Transitioning to Legal Economies. However, its implementation remains unclear. Seven Territorial Missions of the Drug Policy have been announced in 17 municipalities, and it is understood that they are in the planning phase to serve as platforms for implementing this model in prioritized territories.
Meanwhile, in October 2024, the president signed a directive issuing “Guidelines for Coordinating Interinstitutional Actions for Crop Substitution under the 2023–2033 National Drug Policy and the Final Peace Agreement,” which announced new substitution agreements to be managed by Directorate of Illicit Crop Substitution (DSCI) ,the agency in charge of alternative development, in coordination with and funded by other state entities, without referencing the Territorial Missions.
Moreover, this government's implementation of the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS), established under the 2017 Peace Accord, only began this year, aiming to complete the Immediate Action Plan (PAI) component by 2026. The government still needs to comply with Constitutional Court rulings regarding the inclusion of families who signed collective agreements, but were not integrated into the program and the design and implementation of an assistance route for ethnic communities, among other issues. Furthermore, the connection between the PNIS and the Comprehensive Rural Reform remains pending. The government has not presented proposals for this, though it is understood that PNIS families or territories are included in the Territorial Missions or new substitution agreements to be implemented, as recently announced.
In the first year of implementing the new drug policy, two notable developments have been identified:
The first one, other government entities, beyond the Ministry of Justice and the DSCI, have explicitly engaged with the drug policy, not only in the policy document but also in the draft decree establishing the Territorial Missions and the recent presidential directive. Notably, sectors such as Agriculture and the Ministry of Science now include coca-growing families in their public messaging and focus some actions in areas with illicit crops. For the first time in history, the National Narcotics Council approved allocating funds from the Fund for Rehabilitation, Social Investment and Fight against Organized Crime (FRISCO) to the Ministry of Agriculture.
The second one, is the significant reduction in forced manual eradication. The government set a goal of manually eradicating 20,000 hectares in 2023, which it achieved, and committed to 10,000 hectares in 2024—4% of the coca cultivation identified in 2023. This abrupt policy shift demonstrates that the government's goal is not to reduce illicit crops, or at least not at the expense of farming communities by exposing them to greater economic insecurity without plans to integrate them into legal economies or sustainably reduce these crops.
The implementation of the drug policy for illicit crop cultivation aims to progress on three fronts: Territorial Missions, PNIS, and new substitution agreements. However, only information about the PAI component of PNIS is available. There is little information about the other initiatives, and no technical or administrative instruments indicate thorough planning. The government's strategy for transitioning territories with illicit crops to legal economies remains unknown, as do the specific objectives it intends to achieve in the two remaining years of President Petro´s government.
Over the next two years, the government is expected to fulfill its commitments under the PNIS and deliver concrete results that demonstrate the need for a drug policy that contributes to development. The recent announcement to purchase coca crops from families in the department of Cauca lacks clarity on how it will facilitate the area's transition toward legality. There are concerns that implementing this initiative—if it materializes—could divert government attention from ongoing programs that carry significant political costs.
The true value of this approach lies in establishing the foundations for future governments to continue and consolidate state-building processes that, over the long term, transform territories, reduce illicit crops, and weaken the territorial control of armed and criminal actors.
The International Drug Agenda
In line with the president's speeches, the 2023–2033 National Drug Policy envisions Colombia resuming leadership in international forums, advocating for “a structural and critical global reflection on the outcomes of the international drug control regime.” At the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March this year, Colombia achieved several diplomatic victories, reflecting strategic planning in its participation and actions in international forums relevant to drug policy. Continued diplomatic efforts over the next two years are expected to yield concrete results and advances in both international drug policy and Colombia’s domestic policies and those of other countries.
So far, progress is evident in two specific areas:
Alternative Uses for Coca Leaves
Bolivia's initiative to remove or reclassify coca leaves from the International Drug Control System received Colombia's support. Currently, the World Health Organization (WHO) is conducting a “critical review” of the harms and benefits of coca leaves, expected to culminate in a decision via a vote by Commission on Narcotic Drugs member countries in 2025 or 2026. It is anticipated that Colombia and Bolivia will pursue a diplomatic strategy to gain the necessary support to correct the misclassification equating coca leaves with cocaine or heroin in terms of health risks.
This would be a key achievement of the 2023–2033 National Drug Policy, facilitating the legal and political regulation of non-psychoactive uses of coca leaves at the local level, one of its objectives. Progress is still needed to support communities that have developed licit coca leaf projects or start-up companies in various regions of Colombia, awaiting government support for formalization. While actions to promote licit coca leaf-based products have been identified, regulations granting political, legal, and administrative regulations are needed to align with the international drug agenda.
Harm Reduction in Psychoactive Substance Use
At the 2024 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Colombia broke the “Vienna Consensus” by securing approval for a resolution that incorporated for the first time “harm reduction” language in an official Commission document. This aligns with the drug policy objective of “promoting strategies to reduce risks, harms, and stigma associated with psychoactive substance use.”
Progress includes the implementation of CAMAD (Center for Mobile Attention to Drug Addicts) care centers by the Ministry of Health, offering harm reduction actions in municipalities with high drug use prevalence. Between 2022 and 2024, 90 CAMAD centers were established in 53 municipalities, with an investment exceeding 50 billion pesos, representing a notable increase in FRISCO’s investments in addressing substance use. Additionally, a civil society organization opened in Bogotá a supervised consumption room in 2024, while other organizations and local governments are showing interest in similar services.
It is essential for the national and local governments to formulate and execute concrete technical and administrative guidelines for implementing harm reduction measures. These should encourage and facilitate access to services for drug users, designed with clear technical criteria based on their specific needs and contexts, to reduce the risks and harms of drug use.
Otherwise, experiences and new initiatives in this area will continue to develop without a political, technical, or administrative framework to ensure their sustainability and continuity—
key factors for success—and strengthen them through the systematic collection of results and lessons learned. Advances in this direction could prevent future governments from reducing or withdrawing support for harm reduction efforts.